Book Review. The Undignified Part of Constitutional Analysis by Waters, Timothy W.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2014
Book Review. The Undignified Part of
Constitutional Analysis
Timothy W. Waters
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, tiwaters@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Construction Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waters, Timothy W., "Book Review. The Undignified Part of Constitutional Analysis" (2014). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2606.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2606
365Book Review Essay: The Undignified Part of Constitutional Analysis
The Undignified Part of Constitutional Analysis
Timothy William Waters*
Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.): Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 
Fundamental Law (Budapest, CEU Press 2012) ISBN 978-615-5225-18-5
When I lived in Budapest about a decade ago, sympathizers of the political far 
right regularly gathered in the square below my window. Sometimes the rallies 
were large, very large, and late in the evening, as they broke up, men on their 
literal and metaphorical fringes, dressed like betyárok – folk bandits – would stand 
in the street, cracking bullwhips. It was ridiculous but also impressive and in-
timidating, in that way the crack of a whip or the stomp of jackboots usually is.
Not my cup of tea, but evidently it was for a great many people, and this is a 
social fact about Hungary one does well not to forget. The authors of the book 
under review here1 were surely not at those rallies, just as they were not likely to 
have voted for Fidesz, the center-right party whose crushing electoral victory in 
2010 led, on New Year’s Day 2012, to Hungary’s controversial new constitution 
– the Fundamental Law – that this book is so angrily about.
Much like the qualities of a jackboot, that anger is as troubling as it is under-
standable, because this book is, in miniature, an experiment much of the kind a 
constitution is: an effort to forge a common foundation out of diverse elements. 
It is an edited volume, so each of its 14 chapters2 has its author, and sometimes 
two or three – including the late Ronald Dworkin, János Kis, Andrew Arato, 
Gábor Halmai, Sándor Radnóti, Kim Lane Scheppele, a list as redoubtable as one 
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and Associate Director of its 
Center for Constitutional Democracy; 2012-13 Alexander von Humboldt Experienced Researcher 
Fellow, in residence at the Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
in Heidelberg. Thanks to Rachel Guglielmo, Prof. Jeffrey Isaac, Prof. Robert Ivie, Dr András Jakab, 
Christiana Mauro and a reviewer who prefers to remain anonymous for comments on drafts of this 
essay.
1 Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental 
Law (CEU Press 2012). 
2 Plus a preface and amicus brief written by some of the authors, the Venice Commission’s 
opinion on the Fundamental Law, and, quite valuably, the whole text of the Fundamental Law.
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could want for a book on constitutionalism and Hungary – but collectively they 
have chosen to write this book. They have constituted themselves as an integral 
intellectual (and political) community. So we should read them as a whole – ‘par[te] s 
pro toto’3 – the more so because, despite many fine individual contributions, there 
is something singularly wrong with the whole.
The thing wrong is not the attack on the constitution, which well deserves at-
tacking. Disunited Nation lays out several entirely accurate and fair charges against 
the Fundamental Law and its authors in Fidesz: their refusal to incorporate the 
views of opposition parties; the entrenchment of Fidesz’ own political preferences; 
the evisceration of structural checks on executive and parliamentary power that 
had operated in the so-called 1989 constitution drafted at the transition from the 
Communist era, which the Fundamental Law replaces4 – especially the restric-
tion of the much-praised Hungarian constitutional court’s jurisdiction over bud-
getary matters; and the refusal to draft a value-neutral constitution integrating all 
Hungary’s citizens. Readers wishing to know more about these features – defects 
– of the new constitution, and of its authors in Fidesz, will find them thoroughly 
explicated; together these critiques constitute an undeniable indictment of this 
document’s many, serious, occasionally dangerous divergences from broader Eu-
ropean and global patterns of constitutional design and practice. (The book went 
to press before the most recent constitutional amendments and cardinal laws that 
further altered Hungary’s constitutional structure, but these would only have in-
creased the intensity of the criticism.)
So there is much – very much – in this book that will instruct, inform, perhaps 
enrage in a productive sense. Still, we are concerned here, not with the constitu-
tion’s flaws, but the commentary’s – with the charges against the book itself. There 
are three: its dismissive attitude to constitutionalism’s democratic impulses; its 
unprincipled overreach; and its fundamental immoderation. 
For while the constitution is profoundly flawed, so is this book. It can be awk-
ward to criticize something if, by so doing, one might be thought to be defending 
something worse: What if, in declaring the latest study of Hitler poorly done, one 
3 Sándor Radnóti, ‘A Sacred Symbol in a Secular Country: The Holy Crown’, in Tóth, supra 
n. 1, at p. 85 at p. 108.
4 In 1989, as part of the negotiations for the transition to a multi-party democracy, the 
communist Parliament radically amended the existing Basic Law, rather than replacing it with a 
new document. This produced an effectively but not formally new constitution – a unique situation 
in the former Soviet bloc states, and one which, as János Kis ably shows, contributed over time to a 
poisonous constitutional discourse in Hungary. There was one earlier, abortive attempt to introduce 
a new constitution in the 1990s, which foundered, and the issue then lay dormant – festered – 
until Fidesz, which incidentally had not supported the 1989 formula, produced and passed its new 
constitutional draft after the 2010 elections. János Kis, ‘Introduction: From the 1989 Constitution 
to the 2011 Fundamental Law’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 1-21.
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were misunderstood? But that is the risk: To review a text about another text is, 
inevitably, to say something about both.
Imbalanced anti-majoritarianism
The Fundamental Law the authors of this book criticize arises out of Fidesz’s 
overwhelming electoral victory in 2010, which gave that one party the parliamen-
tary supermajority needed to amend the constitution the following year. For the 
authors of Disunited Nation, this apparent popular legitimacy is potentially prob-
lematic, of course, since it suggests that the Fundamental Law might be both 
flawed and, somehow, the people’s desire; the book’s response is a relentless assault 
on majoritarianism’s relationship to constitution-making.
Tactically, this means diminishing the significance of this particular electoral 
victory and its consequences, and this the authors do almost systematically: Fidesz’ 
share of the vote was ‘barely more than 50 percent’5 – as if, in a multi-party 
system, that were anything short of extraordinary. Its parliamentary supermajor-
ity is variously ascribed to the effects of districting,6 disproportional electoral 
rules,7 ‘quirks’,8 and ‘a trick of the existing election law’.9 Even chapters ac-
knowledging the obvious adopt a strangely dismissive language, referring to the 
election as ‘a lopsided vote’,10 or Fidesz’ parliamentary fraction as ‘a transient 
majority’.11 Denying the consequences of an electoral majority is the mark of a 
minority position – the logic of boycott. It is always frustrating to lose: It always 
feels – any child knows this with burning pre-moral intensity – just so unfair.
This is crude stuff, which by trying to deny merely reminds us just how impor-
tant numbers, and democracy, are in the constitutional process. Constitutions 
have something to do with the people’s will, and although the book asserts an 
 5 Andrew Arato, ‘Regime Change, Revolution, and Legitimacy’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 34 
at p. 49.
 6 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Democracy’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 25 at p. 25.
 7 Arato, supra n. 5, at p. 34 at p. 49; Miklós Bánkuti et al., ‘From Separation of Powers to 
Government without Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at 
p. 237 at p. 237, in n. 5.
 8 Zoltán Miklósi, ‘Constitution-Making, Competition, and Cooperation’, in Tóth, supra 
n. 1, at p. 59 at p. 59.
 9 Bánkuti et al., supra n. 7, at p. 237 at p. 253.
10 Bánkuti et al., supra n. 7, at p. 237 at p. 268.
11 Jeremy McBride, ‘Trees in the Wood: The Fundamental Law and the European Court of 
Human Rights’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 359 at p. 371 (criticizing the Fundamental Law’s cardinal 
law provision, which requires a two-third majority of those present and voting in Parliament to 
change certain norms, for ‘allowing a transient majority – which may either be the result of an 
exceptional electoral landslide or just the votes of those present on the day – to give enhanced 
protection to [those matters]’).
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electoral equivalence – calling the Fundamental Law ‘a constitution of one half of 
the nation imposed on the other half against their will’12 – the problem with 
dismissing ‘the present majority’ is that the present majority was really large. 
And large enough to meet all the requirements of amendment. Early on we 
find the claim that the previous, 1989 Constitution gave the opposition a say in 
constitutional reform,13 but this is clearly not true: It only required a two-third 
majority of Parliament. Normally this would give the opposition some purchase 
– no one imagined a single party was likely to achieve this on its own (and in fact 
in 2010 Fidesz won on a common list with KDNP, the small Christian Demo-
cratic People’s Party), but nothing precluded this result. This is a design with 
consequences, an object lesson about the advisability of making the amendment 
process slow or multi-stage and of separating the pouvoir constituant and the pou-
voirs constitués14 – but also a reminder: Constitutional design should assume 
people will not follow their better angels, but instead be self-serving and take 
advantage where they dare. At least, it should recognize that other people’s better 
angels are not necessarily one’s own.
So the fault for the new document lies in the previous one, whose rule allowed 
precisely this outcome – the ‘Achilles’ heel in the Hungarian constitutional 
system’.15 That feature was there for any to take advantage of, if they could mus-
ter the votes for ‘a revolution (...) in the polling booth’.16 It is against that flaw 
that a constitutional critique properly lies, and not against the new constitution, 
which may be contested as politics, but must be acknowledged as valid. 
Unless there is a principled reason not to – and of course, there is: The more 
strategic critiques in Disunited Nation meet the awkward challenge of electoral 
consequentialism, not by pretending Fidesz didn’t win, but by invoking anti-
majoritarian principles. Dworkin, in one of his last published texts, reminds us 
that ‘majority preference in and of itself has no value whatsoever’17 – as true as it 
is convenient for his view of the proper relationship of law to democracy. This 
Dworkinian view permeates the whole book, especially its strong opposition to 
reductions in the jurisdiction of a ‘zealous’18 constitutional court that had ‘elevat[ed] 
12 Kis, supra n. 4, at p. 1 at p. 20-21.
13 Kis, supra n. 4, at p. 1 at p. 5.
14 Oliver W. Lembcke and Christian Boulanger, ‘Between Revolution and Constitution: The 
Roles of the Hungarian Constitutional Court’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 269 at p. 294. Arato also 
ably describes the problem with this design. Arato, supra n. 5, at p. 34-56.
15 Bánkuti et al., supra n. 7, at p. 237 at p. 252.
16 Renata Uitz, ‘Freedom of Religion and Churches: Archeology in a Constitution-making 
Assembly’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 197 at p. 220. The phrase appears elsewhere in the. See Bánkuti 
et al., supra n. 7, p. 237 at p. 253 (noting also that Fidesz itself has presented its electoral victory 
as a revolution).
17 Dworkin, supra n. 6, at p. 25 at p. 31.
18 Dworkin, supra n. 6, at p. 25 at p. 25.
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itself above the will of the democratic legislature’.19 This means there is no need 
to minimize elections or parliamentary super-majorities, because a ‘delusive con-
stitutional majoritarianism’20 is never empowered to violate foundational principles, 
or do anything except produce a value-neutral document that integrates all seg-
ments of societies. The Fundamental Law fails because it ‘does not fulfill the in-
tegrative function of modern constitutions. It is biased in favor of the winners of 
the 2010 elections and against everybody else’.21
Of course, to avoid being just a loser’s veto, this claim of principle must be 
grounded somewhere, and thus a final layer of anti-majoritarian defense: Europe. 
The overriding priority of higher European norms offers a constitution for con-
stitutions, which is why resort to the Venice Commission (the Council of Europe’s 
advisory committee on matters constitutional, which is also quite critical of the 
Fundamental Law), the European Court of Human Rights and the European 
Union are so important to the book’s argument – as fixed references outside and 
above the merely domestic constitutional order.22
All of this simply recapitulates the obvious point that this book shares in a more 
general liberal perspective on constitutionalism, which as an intellectual project 
has quite successfully conflated democracy, constitutionalism, human rights and 
the rule of law, and which is rightly suspicious of populist, national sensibilities: 
Limiting majority power through procedural restraints and fundamental rights is 
one of a constitution’s core protective functions. Still, it can be awkward to harp 
on about it after one has been eviscerated in an election. Because constitution-
making is also a majoritarian act, with the implicit purpose of making – constitut-
ing – a political community. Principles and populations both matter, and a 
defensible constitutional practice must balance the demands of each. 
I do not have a fully developed theory of the relationship between immutable 
principles and respect for human agency expressed in democratic choice – which 
after all is also one of those principles. I only know that it should be a balance, 
meaning that while we need not accept just whatever dangerous violence the 
democratic process churns out – if the Fundamental Law provided for the can-
19 Lembcke and Boulanger, supra n. 14, at p. 269 at p. 276.
20 Gábor Attila Tóth, ‘Preface’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. ix at p. x.
21 Tóth, supra n. 20, at p. ix at p. ix.
22 European perspectives clearly matter to Hungarians across the political spectrum, so this 
is a sensible framework. At the same time, Fidesz’s rhetoric about the EU is very confrontational, 
expressing a skepticism about existing European institutions as a source of dispositive value that 
we must assume is at least accepted, perhaps even approved, by many Hungarian voters, who after 
all in the most recent European Parliamentary election handed Fidesz an absolute majority of both 
votes and seats. (Fidesz took 51% and 12 of 21 seats; Jobbik came in second with almost 15% and 
3 seats; 3 liberal parties took 21% between them and 5 seats, while the Socialists took just under 
11% for 2 seats.)
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nibalistic enslavement of Gypsies, we would be right to object, even if every single 
Hungarian had voted for it – but we properly intrude upon each society’s au-
tonomy only to the extent that truly universally shared values truly require, and 
we must skeptically interrogate our decision to intrude, not make it cavalierly or 
preferentially. Somewhere between the ovens and the traffic code there is a line; I 
don’t know exactly where it should be – I only know it when I don’t see it: Instead, 
prioritizing the abstract claims of structure, rights, and Europe, the authors of 
Disunited Nation leave no space in constitutional deliberation for the popular will 
so recently, forcefully and (to them) disagreeably expressed an election; immutable 
principles determine everything, and the challenges of taking democracy seri-
ously are neutered in a republic of virtue.
The lure of preference
All of which might be all right if those immutable principles really determined 
everything. Here the book’s second problem: an inability to stick to a principled 
position on what a constitution should contain. Formally, the authors’ liberalism 
is insistently value-free and radically plural: ‘to achieve the broadest possible agree-
ment which is still meaningful; in modern secularized societies with a plurality of 
moral convictions, world-views, and interests this cannot be more than a 
minimum’.23 But not all liberalisms are thin, and neither is this one: It is pregnant 
with mandatory desiderata of precisely the kind the authors rightly criticize the 
constitution for entrenching.
An example: The book repeatedly criticizes the Fundamental Law’s protection 
of the heteronormative family and of fetuses, correctly noting the challenge this 
poses to abortion and privacy rights.24 On principle, we are told, these matters 
should not be in the constitution: Important but non-structural matters should 
be left to regular politics, not frozen in constitutions or cardinal laws enacted by 
a contingent super-majority. Protective institutions and rules for political compe-
tition should be entrenched, but walling off non-fundamental norms is ‘incompat-
ible with parliamentarism and the principle of the temporal division of powers’,25 
because this ‘rule[s] out the future ability of the Hungarian legislature, following 
23 Radnóti, supra n. 3, at p. 85 at p. 87.
24 Catherine Dupré, ‘Human Dignity: Rhetoric, Protection, and Instrumentalization’, in Tóth, 
supra n. 1, at p. 143 at p. 152-156; Kriszta Kovács, ‘Equality: The Missing Link’, in Tóth, supra 
n. 1, at p. 171 at p. 194; McBride, supra n. 11, at p. 359 at p. 370; Andrew Arato et al., ‘Opinion 
on the Fundamental Law of Hungary (Amicus Brief )’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 454 at p. 467-469 
and 470-471.
25 Arato et al., supra n. 24, at p. 454 at p. 483.
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the world-wide tendency, to make the institution of marriage available to same-sex 
couples’.26 
But note that tendency: The authors aren’t simply leaving doors open, but 
insisting we go through them – anticipating a particular value-oriented change 
that they want to entrench. For it turns out that sexual orientation ‘requires the 
highest level of legal protection, namely constitutional protection’.27 The consti-
tution is wrong, not for entrenching a rule, but the wrong rule. Nor is this the 
only such instance: Similar internal contradictions – similarly revealing dichotomies 
– appear for rules on social and economic rights, market regulation, the relation-
ship of rights to duties, and references to religion; usually Disunited Nation keeps 
its criticism of the constitution’s particular entrenchments from appearing on 
literally the next page after it has called for entrenching the opposite rule, as hap-
pens here, but one rarely has to read far.
Though one has to read lively, because the twists can be hard to follow: Some-
times it is the antithesis of the good society to lock up an issue, other times the 
good society’s very foundation that something be locked away; some rules are 
criticized for being cardinalized, others for not being. Although notionally moti-
vated by a desire to preserve the policymaking choices of future parliaments, the 
only grounds that consistently explain when this book prefers a given rule to be 
entrenched or left open is a particular liberal vision: not principles but prefer-
ences – and theirs, not those of the party representing an actual but irrelevant 
majority.
Immoderation
These imbalances – principles trumping democracy, and the partisan tilt of those 
principles – suggest a certain immoderation. The authors want a very particular 
constitution – with a certain structure, certain rights, even certain options. It is a 
particular vision – and a very rigid one, which explains why it utterly dispenses 
with democratic legitimacy: They want this model, even if others do not; this 
normative structure is valid and necessary, whatever the humans actually subject 
to it think. Their justifications arise out of a European vision – another abstraction 
of democracy: a Union filled with democracies but not, itself, a famously demo-
cratic institution – and so do their touchstones, even on issues for which there is 
no consistent European practice.
Instead of democratic, their procedure is consultative. And while this is actu-
ally a good idea as a practice of constitutional design, it has its limits. The re-
peated notion that some element should not be in the constitution because it is 
26 Kovács, supra n. 24, at p. 171 at p. 194.
27 Kovács, supra n. 24, at p. 171 at p. 193.
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unacceptable to some part of the people or ‘the nation’28 is hard to square with 
the actual constitutional practice of almost every country: Many constitutions 
indeed have come about through or provide for wide deliberation, but few provide 
an absolute veto for a dissatisfied but undifferentiated minority.29 Any constitu-
tional process ultimately reaches a set of decisions, and it is simply not true that 
everyone has to agree. The authors’ relentless deflation of any majoritarian conse-
quentialism is a political fantasia of social unanimity – and therefore oddly cor-
poratist. But realism is there too, though subterranean: the expectation, sotto voce, 
that the majority must consult with them. 
And not the reverse: The constitutionalism advanced in Disunited Nation is 
formally, insistently integrative, but the authors’ constricted, precise vision of a 
modern constitution’s acceptable contours comprehensively excludes the substan-
tive views of so many of their countrymen, whose normative vision is not empty 
and minimal, but thick and nationally informed. There is little – really, no – evi-
dence that the authors, given the constitutional chance, would craft a text that 
integrates, or even tolerates, their countrymen’s values.
Considering the authors so greatly prize integration, it is striking how exclusive 
their text is: Not one author actually defends the constitution – each chapter, even 
those notionally addressing very esoteric points of law, pointedly opposes it – and 
precious few engage in cool observation. (The best – Kis, Radnóti, Lembcke & 
Boulanger – sustain an objective analysis, keenly tracing, respectively, the poisoned 
politics of the 1989 constitution, the historical context of the Holy Crown 
doctrine,30 and the clashing philosophical approaches to judicial and legislative 
authority animating the two sides, even as each makes patently clear his intense 
dismay at the new constitution.) Could the authors – the editor – not find sen-
sible voices, if not to defend this text, then at least to discuss it without partisan 
purpose? 
On balance I do not like this constitution, and I consider many elements of it 
dangerously defective, but even I could easily defend other parts of it, or describe 
its admixture of very troubling and entirely anodyne elements, or its (thoroughly 
28 Tóth, supra n. 20, at p. ix at p. xii; Kis, supra n. 4, at p. 1 at pp. 1 and 20-21. Similar 
arguments appear in Radnóti, supra n. 3, p. 85 at p. 109 (noting, accurately, that the Fundamental 
Law’s ‘ideology does not apply to the entire nation while at the same time it stretches beyond it’, 
meaning to ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of the state); Zsolt Körtvélyesi, ‘From “We the 
People” to “We the Nation”’, in Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 111-140 (discussing the Fundamental Law’s 
changes to national and civic understandings of who is a Hungarian).
29 Federal systems, of course, can provide such a veto for identified – differentiated – com-
munities. Hungary is not a federal state.
30 The Holy Crown of King-Saint Stephen, the founder of the Christian Hungarian kingdom, 
is a central legitimating motif of contemporary Hungarian rightist constitutionalism, and its literal 
and metaphorical move from the National Museum to Parliament is the subject of one of the book’s 
best and liveliest chapters. Radnóti, supra n. 3, at p. 85-109.
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modern) admixture of traditional nationalism and contemporary constitutional-
ism; or I could describe the processes that brought things to this troubled state 
without taking sides, and many scholars of and in Hungary could do all this much 
better than I. Such people exist – after all, such people must exist, unless the authors 
really believe that the entire right in Hungary is mad, senselessly, witlessly mad, 
and with them the 69% of the electorate who voted for these madmen or those 
worse – those farther right – than them.31
Too much in Disunited Nation suggests its authors believe exactly that. Thus 
the urgency about jackboots: The all-too-ready charge, surfacing occasionally in 
this book, that the new constitution returns to the darkest currents of 20th cen-
tury Fascism (including references, in language now elliptical, now direct, to south-
ern US states of unspecified date and Francisco Franco), suggests that the authors 
view the Hungarian constitution through the lens of a politically engaged, Mani-
chean intellectual struggle, as if drawing sustaining outrage from a contest with 
the notional moral clarity of some endless Spanish Civil War.
Politics is a rough game, and one of its weapons is to claim that one’s prefer-
ences are purest principle. If one understands this book as political, then its in-
consistencies are just ways to win the argument. But if one imagines it to be a 
work of scholarship, and takes its principled claims for what they ought to be, one 
might be disappointed. Its critique, taken as a whole, lacks that cool, detached 
faculty that both makes an argument scholarly – that makes it scholarship instead 
of a knife fight – and, in this case, would have allowed its authors to apprehend 
the irony in their own critique.
For if Disunited Nation constitutes a kind of experiment, the results are trou-
bling: Its authors convince us that the Fundamental Law is a flawed, even danger-
ous document, but we should wonder – unlikely event – what constitution they 
might write. Better on many counts, I am sure, but also, I suspect, strident and 
31 69%, because that is the share of the popular vote won by Fidesz or parties the authors can 
tolerate even less. The far-right, anti-Gypsy and anti-Semitic Jobbik party polled 16% in the 2010 
elections, becoming the third largest party in the Parliament. Much external discussion of Hungary’s 
constitutional transformation conflates Jobbik and Fidesz, but in fact these are competitor parties, 
and Jobbik’s parliamentary fraction voted against the new constitution. But from the point of 
view of the authors of Disunited Nation, this is no solace, and nothing in their constitutional 
prescriptions contemplates how to integrate this sizable part of Hungary’s population into the 
polity. In the most recent election, in April 2014, Fidesz again won, with 44% of the vote – less 
than last time, but still far and away the most dominant party; Jobbik improved its share to around 
20%. The electoral rules again give Fidesz a disproportionately large share of the parliamentary 
seats, but give Jobbik a disproportionately small share. So, reading backwards from this election – a 
perilous exercise – one might now say that a majority of Hungarian voters have chosen parties that 
opposed the constitution; but this requires one to assimilate the socialists, liberals and Jobbik to a 
common position. In the European elections in May, as noted above, Fidesz and Jobbik together 
took 66% of the vote.
374 Timothy William Waters EuConst 10 (2014)
self-righteous in a way we should beware, left, right or center. It is telling that the 
book includes a brief several of the authors submitted to the Venice Commission 
when it was evaluating the Fundamental Law.32 The incapacity of that partisan 
text, as so many of the chapters, to separate legal analysis from political preference 
is comprehensive and irredeemable. And here we see, as so often happens, a curi-
ous convergence: the unyielding determination with which each – constitution 
and commentary – advances its own desire, to the exclusion of any other vision 
of the good life. The authors of Disunited Nation are no more capable of, indeed 
no more interested in uniting the nation on terms other than their preference, 
than is the constitution they criticize. They presumably recognize the very real 
immoderation in the Fundamental Law because, with a different coloring, it is 
their own.
32 Arato et al., supra n. 24, at p. 454 at p. 467-469 and 470-471. The book also includes the 
Venice Commission’s own opinion, Tóth, supra n. 1, at p. 491-535.
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